Opinion: Erdogan Reshapes Middle Eastern Power Politics

 
Image via Middle East Moniter, [Ali Balıkçı - Anadolu Agency]

Image via Middle East Moniter, [Ali Balıkçı - Anadolu Agency]


Opinion: Erdogan Reshapes Middle Eastern Power Politics

Many choose to highlight the historic Arab-Israeli accords or the increasing US, Israeli, and Sunni Arab pressure on Iran as one of 2020’s major strategic developments in the Middle East. However, it is Turkey, and its ambitious and increasingly authoritarian president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, which has caused the biggest shockwaves in regional politics this year. Turkey, a NATO member, is traditionally portrayed as a Western ally and the partner of a greater “Sunni front” in the Middle East. Yet, Turkey now clearly leads a new regional axis, reminiscent of the old Ottoman Empire and exerting influence through radical, populist Islamism. While Erdogan faces domestic opposition and various crises, 2020 marks a major turning point for his aggressive foreign policy and ambitious imperial designs. Turkey now represents the greatest threat to the Western-backed regional establishment, and the greatest potential for regional hegemony. 

Turkish politics have been dominated by the staunchly conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP), and a prime-minister-turned-president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, since 2007. The country and its politics were previously an example of uncompromising secularism: the separation of state and religion. This was embodied by Turkey’s first president since the fall of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk – and these secular values have been ferociously defended by the Turkish political establishment, military, and main state institutions. Under Erdogan, and despite resistance from these institutions (especially the military, in the form of an attempted coup in 2016), Turkey has been progressively de-secularised – the president arguing for a strong defence of religious values in every aspect of politics and society. This has been accompanied by increasing authoritarianism, highlighted by the controversial constitutional reforms in 2017, and the purge and brutal crackdown that followed the 2016 failed military coup. 

Turkey’s foreign policy has also evolved accordingly. A strategy that was previously based on strong cooperation with the United States and Israel, and a desire to join the European Union, has recently turned towards the East. Erdogan is accused by his critics of nostalgia for the Ottoman Empire, seeking to rebuild the old empire by exerting influence on his weaker and divided Arab neighbours. Similarly to his domestic politics, Erdogan has utilised populist and religious rhetoric, attempting to form a coalition around traditional Islamic values.

Since the Iranian revolution of 1979, Iran has always been feared as the largest threat to the regional status quo. Through its revolutionary rhetoric and support for minority Shia forces throughout the Muslim World, Iran posed a direct threat to Sunni majority states, including the oil-rich monarchies in the Gulf, as well as the United States and Israel. Following its growing influence among the large Shia communities in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, many still fear a growing “Shia crescent” threatening Sunni and Western influence over the region. 

Despite its incredible rise, the Iranian-led axis has been under threat this year, and it is Turkey that is showing greater potential for regional hegemony. Most importantly, Turkey is not as economically or diplomatically isolated as Iran, giving it better access to the global market and the resources available. Turkey is part of NATO and will therefore remain, at least officially, a partner of the United States and its military alliance – unlike its neighbor Iran, which has been drowned in sanctions ever since the Revolution, and recently a victim of former U.S. President Trump’s maximum pressure campaign. Turkey also shares ties with Israel and Arab countries, both politically and economically. 

Furthermore, being a Sunni majority country, Turkey’s regional influence is much more far-reaching. While Iran’s regional influence is mostly limited to Shia minorities scattered around the Arab world, Turkey can export its brand of populist Islamism to a greater portion of the Arab World, as well as outside the region, as it has increased its influence in Muslim regions of Africa and South East Asia. 

Erdogan and the AKP have historically held strong ties with the transnational network of militant Islamist parties that is the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood, and its strong popular support, have been a crucial tool for Erdogan’s Turkey to spread influence through pan-Islamism. Turkey and its main Arab ally, Qatar, first attempted to pounce on the opportunities presented by the 2011 Arab Spring, and the possibilities it offered to Muslim Brotherhood-affiliates to run in and win post-revolution elections. With the exception of Tunisia, the Arab Spring failed to materialise into concrete political gains for Turkey and the rest of its allies. 

Most would interpret the power struggle in the Middle East as one between Sunni and Shia, camps which are led by Saudi Arabia and Iran, respectively. This analysis of a strict sectarian divide is outdated, just as is the idea of a unified “Sunni axis.” Turkey and Qatar have, at least since the Arab Spring, used their influence to undermine authoritarian Sunni regimes in favour of populist Islamist movements, embodied by the Muslim Brotherhood. This is a clear split with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and its allies, who have attempted to maintain the status quo by supporting fellow secular authoritarian regimes, outlawing the Muslim Brotherhood. Turkey, Qatar, and its allies constitute a new axis in the region, one with greater reach and more potential for political upheaval. 

Turkey’s failed attempt in 2011 for widespread regime change was emphasised by failures in both Egypt and Syria. While the Turkish-backed Muslim Brotherhood managed to take power in Egypt following post-revolution elections, the government was overthrown two years later by a Saudi and UAE-backed military coup which restored the old regime. In Syria, despite Turkish involvement in funding and arming an array of rebel militias, including jihadist groups, Assad’s regime still stands to this day.

2020, however, has been a crucial turning point for Erdogan’s fortunes in implementing his aggressive foreign policy. Despite the Covid pandemic and economic difficulties at home, Turkey has achieved important foreign policy goals through both symbolic and military strategies.

Symbolically, Erdogan has made strides in presenting himself as a leader of the Muslim World, championing traditional Islamic values and breaking away from the West. In pushing for Islamism against secularism, Erdogan symbolically reverted the contested Hagia Sophia (a museum since 1935) back to a mosque, despite international condemnation, as well as criticism from Turkey’s minority-Christian Greek population. Erdogan has also been extremely vocal in his criticism of French President Emmanuel Macron, especially over the Macron government’s contested reforms concerning secularism following the October terrorist attacks. Erdogan led a widespread boycott of French products throughout the Muslim world, showcasing his far-reaching ideological influence. In the face of various Arab countries mending ties with Israel, Erdogan has also rhetorically led the charge against the “Zionist state,” pushing for pan-Islamic solidarity with Palestine and support for its Islamist ally, Hamas.

Meanwhile, Turkey has symbolically progressively broken away from its “special relationship” with the West. Erdogan has weaponised the refugee crisis, using the Syrian and Afghan migrants stuck at its border as leverage against the EU, threatening to open the gates. This has created an antagonistic and tense relationship especially with French and German leaders. The gates were ultimately opened following the EU’s opposition to Turkish operations in Syria. Turkey also slighted the US by breaking NATO rules and investing in the Russian S400 missile system. Turkey has sought to ameliorate its ties with Russia, as an alternative to NATO and the West. 

Erdogan has also flexed his muscles militarily, again both in expanding his regional Islamist ambitions and confronting the West and its allies. Turkey has, for several years, attempted to build a transnational Sunni-Islamist militia network, imitating Iran’s success in punching over its weight through its own network of Shia militias. Turkey deployed its proxy Syrian militias to support the Turkish and Muslim Brotherhood-backed government in Libya. Thanks to Turkish military support, Fayez al-Sarraj’s government in Libya survived, beating back the Saudi and UAE-backed rebel forces. Turkey also deployed its proxy Islamist militias, as well as its own military, in helping its ally Azerbaijan claim victory in its war against Armenia. 

Turkey’s network of militias were also unleashed on Western-backed Kurdish forces in Syria. In eliminating Kurdish forces in Syria, Erdogan was mainly combatting the separatist threat of Turkey’s own Kurdish minority. Along with Turkey’s aggressive moves in the East Mediterranean, threatening mostly Greek waters, it shows a willingness from Turkey to intimidate or even attack Western allies – a reality far-fetched from its historic special relationship with especially the U.S. 

These military victories were important in securing Turkish political and economic aims. Turkey has established itself as a patron to various Arab groups, reminiscent of the days of the old Ottoman Empire. Turkey also symbolically came to the defence of ethnic-Turkic populations outside its borders, in Azerbaijan notably, but also fighting by their side against Kurdish forces in Iraq. Economically, Turkish military action in Libya and the East Mediterranean have been part of a push to secure crucial off-shore oil and natural gas.

2020 has shown that Turkey has aggressive regional plans, spreading its ideology of militant Islamism against the regional establishment and the monarchies of the Gulf. It has shown that Turkey is willing to deploy its military on multiple fronts to expand its interests, and it has shown that despite still holding a place in NATO, Turkey’s enthusiasm in the alliance is decreasing. While spending much of the last two decades in the background of a Saudi-Iranian Cold War, Turkey has established itself in the past few years as a major regional power, willing to exert its influence far beyond its borders, with 2020 as a crucial turning point in its fortunes. 


Sebran Bruha is a French-American fourth year student at the University of Edinburgh studying International Relations.